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REGULATING CRIME LABORATORIES:  
THE IMPACT OF DNA EVIDENCE 
Paul C. Giannelli, J.D., M.S.* 
INTRODUCTION  
One of the most trenchant criticisms of crime laboratories 
was made in 1991 by Professor Randolph Jonakait in his multi-
pronged attack on forensic science.1 He argued that the 
“[c]urrent regulation of clinical labs indicates that a regulatory 
system can improve crime laboratories.”2 This critique was 
                                                          
* Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of 
Law, Case Western Reserve University. University of Virginia, J.D. 1970, 
LL.M. 1975; George Washington University, M.S. Forensic Science, 1973. 
1 See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 
4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 109 (1991). Before Jonakait wrote on the subject, 
only a few articles appeared in the legal literature, and they were quite 
favorable. See Irving C. Stone, Capabilities of Modern Forensic 
Laboratories, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 674 (1984) (“This Article has 
demonstrated the ability of forensic science laboratories to provide useful, 
accurate information in a variety of areas.”); Marion E. Williams, The FBI 
Laboratory—Its Availability and Use by Prosecutors from Investigation to 
Trial, 28 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 95 (1960) (“These examinations are based 
on sound scientific principles, far from the scene of the crime, by experts 
dedicated to the principle of reporting fact regardless of whether they may 
convict the guilty or acquit the innocent.”). See also Paul L. Kirk, The 
Interrelationship of Law and Science, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 393 (1963) 
(explaining the role of forensic science in the legal system). For a more 
recent article by a criminalist, see Henry C. Lee, Forensic Science and the 
Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (1993) (“Perhaps the most important 
issue in forensic science is the establishment of professional standards.”). 
2 Jonakait, supra note 1, at 191. Clinical labs are regulated under the 
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
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largely ignored by the forensic science community, as was 
another unfavorable legal commentary published about the same 
time.3 Nevertheless, a far more powerful engine for reform was 
on the horizon—DNA technology. In the same year that Jonakait 
published his article, molecular biologist Eric Lander, who got 
caught up in the DNA evidence debates, wrote: “At present, 
forensic science is virtually unregulated—with the paradoxical 
result that clinical laboratories must meet higher standards to be 
allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs must meet to 
put a defendant on death row.”4 
Part I of this article traces the history of crime laboratories 
in this country, from their creation in California in the 1920s to 
their nationwide expansion in the 1930s to their explosive 
growth at the end of the century. Part II then discusses two 
significant developments, the advent of proficiency testing and 
the establishment of the first voluntary laboratory accreditation 
program. The introduction of DNA evidence and its impact on 
forensic science and crime laboratories in particular is examined 
in Part III. Next, Part IV discusses the American Bar 
Association (ABA) initiatives regarding the regulation of crime 
laboratories — the adoption of recommendations emanating from 
the ABA Committee on Innocence and the subsequent 
promulgation of Criminal Justice Standards for DNA Evidence. 
                                                          
578 (1988), 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2004). 
3 See D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy For 
Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 738 (1989) (“Our literature search for empirical 
evaluation of handwriting identification turned up one primitive and flawed 
validity study from nearly 50 years ago, one 1973 paper that raises the issue 
of consistency among examiners but that presents only uncontrolled 
impressionistic and anecdotal information not qualifying as data in any 
rigorous sense, and a summary of one study in a 1978 government report. 
Beyond this, nothing.”) (citations omitted). 
4 Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505 
(1989). 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY 
 It should come as no surprise that a society as dependent 
on science as ours would turn to that discipline to solve crimes. 
Forensic laboratories were first introduced as reform efforts, 
providing a reliable alternative to the vagaries of eyewitness 
testimony and the “third degree” abuses used in eliciting 
confessions. Nevertheless, their history is checkered, with 
periods of rapid growth, followed by years of neglect. 
Moreover, their place in the police organizational structure 
remains ambivalent, and their function in the adversary system 
is often problematic. 
A. The Early Laboratories 
In 1923, Los Angeles established the country’s first crime 
laboratory.5 August Vollmer, sometimes known as the “father” 
of modern policing in America,6 created the laboratory during 
his brief tenure as Chief of Police in Los Angeles. As the first 
police chief in Berkeley, Vollmer had used scientists on several 
                                                          
5 See RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
FORENSIC SCIENCE 6 (5th ed. 1995) (“The oldest forensic laboratory in the 
United States is that of the Los Angeles Police Department, created in 1923 
by August Vollmer, a police chief from Berkeley, California.”). There is 
some dispute about which lab was established first. V.A. Leonard states that 
Vollmer first created a lab at Berkeley. V.A. LEONARD, THE POLICE OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 141 (1964). Professor Thornton disagrees. See John I. 
Thornton, Criminalistics: Past, Present and Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA 1, 
23 (1975) (“In 1923, Vollmer served as Chief of Police of the City of Los 
Angeles for a period of one year. During that time, a crime laboratory was 
established at his direction.”). Some commentators cite Chicago as the initial 
lab. E.g., Charles M. Wilson, Crime Detection Laboratories in the United 
States, in LAW, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, AND JUSTICE 464 (Larry Baer ed., 
1964), reprinted in FORENSIC SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 96, 98 (Joseph L. Peterson ed., 1975). This is also 
incorrect. See Thornton, supra, at 24. 
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_Vollmer (last visited Sept. 21, 
2006). 
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occasions to investigate crimes,7 and in 1916, he helped found 
the first School of Criminology at the University of California, 
at Berkeley.8 By 1930, the L.A. Sheriff’s Department had set up 
a lab to serve the unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County, 
and in 1931, a statewide laboratory was opened in Sacramento 
under the auspices of the Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
Investigation. San Francisco followed suit later that year.9 
Another early lab, operated by the Chicago police, traced its 
roots to the infamous 1929 St. Valentine’s Day Massacre where 
five gangsters and two acquaintances were gunned down.10 The 
Massacre attracted national attention, in part, because some of 
the perpetrators wore police uniforms and fled in a “squad” car. 
Many suspected police involvement in the planning and 
execution of the Massacre.11 A “blue ribbon” coroner’s jury, 
empanelled to investigate the crime, contacted Colonel Calvin 
Goddard, who maintained an independent firearms laboratory in 
New York, to analyze the crime scene bullets and cartridge 
cases.12 Goddard tested and excluded all police-issued Thompson 
                                                          
7 For example, Vollmer enlisted the services of a professor of chemistry 
in a poisoning case in 1907 and later used a microscopist in a different case, 
both from the University of California. Thornton, supra note 5, at 22. 
8 See Berkeley Police Dep’t History, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ 
police/history/history.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
9 Thornton, supra note 5, at 23-24. See also David Q. Burd, The 
Laboratory Section of the California State Bureau Criminal Identification and 
Investigation, 43 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 829, 829 (1953) 
(“In [1931], one civil service position of Chemist and Ballistics Expert was 
established, and some new equipment was obtained.”). 
10 See Calvin Goddard, The Valentine Day Massacre: A Study in 
Ammunition-Tracing, 1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 60, 60 (1930). 
11 Id. at 76 (“Since two of the members of the execution squad had worn 
police uniforms, and since it had been subsequently intimated by various 
persons that the wearers of the uniforms might really have been policeman 
rather than disguised gangsters, it became a matter of no little importance to 
ascertain, if possible, whether these rumors had any foundation in fact.”). 
12 Goddard, often credited as the “father” of firearms identification, was 
responsible for much of the early work on the subject. See Calvin Goddard, 
Scientific Identification of Firearms and Bullets, 17 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 254 (1926). 
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submachine guns as the murder weapons and months later 
matched the bullets to two machine guns seized from the home 
of Fred Burke, a suspect in the killings.13 It was later learned 
that a rival gang, headed by Al Capone, instigated the 
murders.14 A member of the coroner’s jury was so impressed 
with Goddard’s work that he offered to fund a crime lab—The 
Scientific Crime Laboratory of Chicago.15 As part of this 
endeavor, Goddard traveled to Europe to learn about the 
continental forensic system.16 
“The laboratory, with Col. Goddard as its first director, was 
established at the Law School of Northwestern University, in 
1929-30. John Henry Wigmore, Dean of the Law School, was 
responsible for this site.”17 Given Goddard’s background, the 
lab’s cases “were heavily biased toward firearms identification, 
with considerably less emphasis placed on trace evidence, blood, 
and other areas.”18 The city took over the laboratory in 1938.19 
J. Edgar Hoover began the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
                                                          
13 See Goddard, supra note 10, at 76-77. 
14 See Lee Bey, Crime Lab Heads Into History: For 56 Yrs., Venerable 
Facility Has Helped Cops Solve Cases, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994, 
at 15 (“Chicago might not have been the first city with a crime lab if Al 
Capone hadn’t ordered the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre in 1929.”); Jim 
Ritter, St. Valentine’s Hit Spurred Creation of Nation’s First Lab, CHICAGO 
SUN-TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 40 (“Sixty-eight years ago this Friday, Al 
Capone’s hit men dressed as cops and gunned down seven men in the Clark 
Street headquarters of rival mobster Bugs Moran.”). 
15 See JOE NICKELL & JOHN F. FISCHER, CRIME SCIENCE: METHODS OF 
FORENSIC DETECTION 13 (1999) (“Perhaps the first truly significant crime 
laboratory that could be called a national lab was the Scientific Crime 
Detection Laboratory, which began at Chicago in 1929. . . .”). 
16 See Calvin Goddard, Scientific Crime Detection Laboratories in 
Europe, 1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 13, 15 (1930) (“My provisional opinion that 
the United States is, for the most part, immeasurably behind Europe in 
scientific methods of crime detection was completely confirmed.”). 
17 Wilson, supra note 5, at 467. 
18 Thornton, supra note 5, at 25. 
19 Id. at 26 (“In 1938 the laboratory was transferred to the Chicago 
Police Department in return for a payment of $25,000 to Northwestern 
University.”). The Chicago lab was taken over by the Illinois State Police in 
1996. See Bey, supra note 14. 
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(“FBI”) crime laboratory in 1932. Hoover, the FBI director, 
was intrigued with the idea of creating a lab and so he sent an 
agent, Charles Appel, in 1931 to attend a training course offered 
at Goddard’s lab.20 At its inception, the FBI lab had firearms 
identification (“ballistics”) and fingerprint examiners.21 “During 
its first month of service, the FBI Laboratory examiners handled 
20 cases. In its first full year of operation, the volume increased 
to a total of 963 examinations. By the next year that figure more 
than doubled.”22 Handwriting comparisons, the examination of 
various types of trace evidence (e.g., hairs, fibers, soils), and 
serological testing of blood and semen would be added later.23 
During this time, several sensational cases highlighted the 
value of forensic evidence. The Sacco and Vanzetti trial in 1921 
was one of the first cases to use firearms identification 
evidence,24 and the extensive use of handwriting comparison 
                                                          
20 Thornton, supra note 5, at 25. 
21 At that time, it was called the Criminological Laboratory. By 1933, it 
was known as the Technical Laboratory. Ten years later it was renamed the 
FBI Laboratory. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FBI LABORATORY 3 (1981). 
22 Anniversary Report, 40 Years of Distinguished Scientific Assistance to 
Law Enforcement, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 4 (Nov. 1972). 
23 Id. at 6, 25. 
24 Sacco and Vanzetti were charged with murder during a payroll 
robbery in 1921. Many believe their executions resulted more from their 
foreign status and “radical” beliefs as anarchists than from the cogency of the 
evidence presented against them. The presentation of the firearms 
identification evidence in that case remains problematic. Professors Joughin 
and Morgan commented on this issue: 
On October 23 Captain Proctor made an affidavit indicating that 
he had repeatedly told [the prosecutor] that he would have to 
answer in the negative if he were asked whether he had found 
positive evidence that the fatal bullet had been fired from 
Sacco’s pistol. The statement which Proctor made on the witness 
stand was: “My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired 
by that pistol.” 
G. LOUIS JOUGHIN & EDMUND M. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO & 
VANZETTI 15 (1948). See also James E. Starrs, Once More Unto the Breech: 
The Firearms Evidence in the Sacco and Vanzetti Case Revisited, Parts I & 
II, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 630, 1050 (1986). The case was also one of the first 
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testimony at the Lindbergh kidnapping trial in 1935 solidified 
the role of the crime lab in the criminal justice system.25 As one 
commentator noted, Bruno Hauptmann’s conviction and 
execution for the Lindbergh kidnapping and murder, “on the 
basis of circumstantial scientific evidence, created landmarks in 
scientific crime detection, in the utilization of forensic scientists, 
and in the courtroom presentation of scientific and demonstrative 
evidence.”26 
Crime laboratories soon sprang up in other large cities27 but 
not without some disquietude.28 As one scholar observed, “Most 
                                                          
to raise the issue of the eyewitness misidentification. See FELIX 
FRAGNKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1927) (“What is 
the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The 
identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.”). 
25 State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935). 
26 Michael Baden, Plenary Session: The Lindbergh Kidnapping Revisited: 
Forensic Sciences Then and Now, 28 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1035 (1983). See also 
D. Michael Risinger et al., supra note 3, at 770-71 (Albert Osborn, one of 
the seven handwriting experts who testified against Hauptmann, “became a 
kind of public hero, and the validity of ‘scientific’ handwriting identification 
when practiced by a ‘competent’ practitioner became public knowledge, 
which like much public knowledge, turns out to be not so clearly right.”). 
27 See Joseph L. Peterson, The Crime Lab, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE 
184, 185 (Carl Klockars ed., 1983) (“[T]he Chicago Crime Laboratory has 
the distinction of being one of the oldest in the country. Soon after, however, 
many other jurisdictions also built police laboratories in an attempt to cope 
with the crimes of violence associated with the 1930s gangster era.”). 
28 Joseph Nicol wrote : 
After the early 1930s, crime laboratories were established in 
rapid fashion until nearly all states and the major cities had some 
facility for examining evidence. Not all laboratories were 
properly founded. No model existed and the development 
depended upon local whim and resources. For reasons of local 
pride, some departments created laboratories by the device of a 
name on the door. In many places, what may be called a crime 
laboratory is in fact a small step beyond a latent fingerprint and 
photographic set-up, adequate for evidence collection but 
unsuited by equipment and staff to engage in the analysis and 
evaluation of evidence. 
Joseph D. Nicol, Present Status of Criminalistics, in LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 245 (S.A. Yefsky ed., 1967). See also Thornton, 
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laboratories owe their existence, not to a progressive attitude on 
the part of police administrators, but because the police agencies 
inaugurating laboratory services were shamed into it by adverse 
publicity or the threat of it.”29 
B. Laboratory Expansion 
From 1970 to 1980, the number of laboratories doubled, 
from about 100 to more than 200, with statewide systems 
becoming more common.30 “During this period, Supreme Court 
decisions restricting police interrogation practices, the 
President’s Crime Commission Report and advice to police to 
place greater reliance on physical evidence, the creation of the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the 
availability of federal monies, the drug abuse explosion, and the 
upsurge in violent crime were all factors that stimulated the 
growth of laboratories.”31 Expansion, however, brought its own 
                                                          
supra note 5, at 27 (noting that “all too often the laboratory was poorly 
conceived, poorly equipped, and poorly staffed”); Wilson, supra note 5, at 
464 (“The historical picture of crime detection laboratories in the United 
States is rather discouraging when viewed factually.”). 
29 Thornton, supra note 5, at 27. 
30 See Jan S. Bashinski & Joseph L. Peterson, Forensic Sciences, in 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: POLICE MANAGEMENT 559, 561 (4th ed. William 
Geller & Darrel Stephens eds., 2004) (“Until 1970, most crime laboratories 
were located in cities and counties, but in the 1970s and 1980s, statewide 
systems of crime laboratories became popular. More than a dozen states 
(including California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, 
and Texas) adopted such configurations to deliver scientific services to 
medium- and small-size communities not already served by local laboratories. 
These statewide systems now act in tandem with municipal and county 
facilities in many states and provide the great bulk of service to state and 
local law enforcement agencies.”) Many states established their laboratories 
statutorily. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 691.1 (West 1997); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-2502 (1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2261 (1997); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 44-3-301 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-01-10 (1997); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 307.75 (West 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-103 
(1982); TEX. REV. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4413(14) (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 
2.1-426 (1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.75 (West 1997). 
31 Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the 
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problems. It occurred “without the benefit of national planning 
or direction. The newly formed laboratories and existing 
laboratories continued to suffer from the same old problems: 
lack of coordination, unqualified personnel, and the absence of 
uniform standards and procedures to guide the analysis and 
interpretation of evidence.”32 
C. Crime Commissions 
At the incipient stages of this expansion, two different 
presidential crime commissions reviewed the status of forensic 
laboratories, thus providing additional perspectives on their 
development. In 1967, President Johnson’s Crime Commission 
made the following observation: 
The crime laboratory has been the oldest and 
strongest link between science and technology and 
criminal justice. Because of this tradition, and 
because the best laboratories, such as the FBI’s, are 
well advanced, the Science and Technology Task 
Force did not devote major attention to 
criminalistics.33 
The Task Force’s “impression” that forensic science was not 
in need of serious attention, according to one commentator, 
“astounded most practicing criminalists,” and was due, in part, 
                                                          
Nation’s Criminal Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10, 11 (1985). 
32 Peterson, supra note 27, at 185. See also Thornton, supra note 5, at 
29-30 (“A few laboratories in the country are adequately supported, but most 
have some deficiency in equipment, staff, physical plant, or position in an 
agency structure.”). 
33 INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 17-18 (1967). See also 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967) 
(repeating the Task Force’s conclusions). According to Professor Kirk, 
“Criminalistics has been defined as that profession and scientific discipline 
directed to the recognition, identification, individualization and interpretation 
of physical evidence through the application of the natural sciences to law and 
science matters.” Kirk, supra note 1, at 394. 
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to “the treacle which emanated from the FBI laboratory for 
several decades.”34 At about the same time, another practitioner 
noted that “criminalistics is poorly equipped to deal with the 
enlarged responsibilities which have been so quickly thrust upon 
it.”35 
Interestingly, a different Commission Task Force, one on the 
police, painted a somewhat different picture: “Proximity, 
timeliness, and quality are the most important measures of 
laboratory service. Some local police forces fail on all three 
counts because they do not perform scientific evaluations 
requiring sophisticated analysis, or fail to provide for tests.”36 
The Commission did acknowledge that “the great majority of 
police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and 
lack highly skilled personnel able to use the modern equipment 
now being developed.”37 As a remedy, the Commission 
recommended the establishment of regional laboratories and the 
expansion of research activities.38 
In 1974, President Nixon’s Crime Commission also 
addressed the subject, observing that “[t]oo many police crime 
laboratories have been set up on budgets that preclude the 
recruitment of qualified professional personnel” and “[t]oo often 
the laboratory is not considered a primary budget item and is 
one of the first units to suffer when budgets are trimmed. Such 
practices relegate the crime laboratory to an inferior position 
among other support services.”39 This last point raised an 
important issue—a lab’s placement in a police department’s 
                                                          
34 Thornton, supra note 5, at 30. 
35 Wilkaan Fong, Criminalistics and the Prosecutor, in PRACTICING LAW 
INSTITUTE, THE PROSECUTOR’S SOURCEBOOK 323 (James George & Ira 
Cohen eds., 1969). 
36 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 91 (1967). The Report added: “The 
cost of staffing a laboratory facility capable of handling all needs of a police 
department is considerable, and a complete program is beyond the financial 
ability of most departments.” Id. at 92. 
37 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra note 33, at 255. 
38 Id. 
39 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND 
GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 304-05 (1974). 
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organizational structure.40 “Many laboratories are situated in a 
position in an agency structure where the laboratory director 
reports to a police officer who lacks understanding of the 
criminalistics function.”41 
The Commission noted, as did its predecessor, that the cost 
of operating a crime lab was “perhaps beyond the financial 
capabilities of most police agencies.”42 Nevertheless, it found 
that “most police agencies were unwilling to give up their 
laboratories, even when they were not used effectively.”43 
D. 1983 Survey 
A survey of crime labs in 1983 provides a snapshot of the 
organization and practices of the more than 300 labs operating at 
that time.44 Approximately 80 percent of the laboratories were 
situated within law enforcement and public safety agencies, with 
the remaining labs located in medical examiners’ offices, 
prosecutors’ offices, scientific/public health agencies, and other 
public or private institutions.45 “Fifty-seven percent of the 
                                                          
40 One commentator states that the top laboratories are characterized by 
the following attributes: 
 they (1) report to someone close to chief executive level in the 
host agency,” (2) are “accredited,” (3) “measure . . . and 
respond . . . to customer needs while maintaining scientific 
integrity,” and (4) have “a significant proportion (at least 25%) 
of [their] operating budget devoted to quality assurance and 
training. 
W.J. Tilstone, Organization of Laboratories, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
FORENSIC SCIENCES 68, 73 (Jay A. Seigel et al. eds., 2000). 
41 Thornton, supra note 5, at 36. 
42 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 305. 
43 Id. at 301. 
44 Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the 
Nations’s Criminal Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10 (1985). The survey 
was based on a compilation of 319 federal, state, and local crime 
laboratories. Each received a copy of an eight-page questionnaire. “The 
response rate was 82% (260/319) with a total of 257 usable questionnaires.” 
Id. at 11. 
45 Id. 
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responding laboratories would only examine evidence submitted 
by law enforcement officials.”46 Of the laboratories surveyed, 
over 90 percent examined drugs, while more than 75 percent 
analyzed semen, bloodstains, fibers, hairs, accelerants, paint, 
and toolmarks.47 Over half performed firearms, glass, alcohol, 
explosives, and fingerprints examinations, while less than half 
evaluated questioned documents, gunshot residues, voiceprints, 
or toxicological samples.48 The survey also revealed that, on 
average, laboratory examiners testified in eight percent of the 
drug prosecutions (ranging from 0 to 86 percent) and in 10 
percent of criminalistics cases (ranging from 0 to 87 percent). In 
other words, government experts were rarely challenged. 
Moreover, “[o]n the average, examiners conferred with 
prosecutors in 57 percent of cases, but with defense attorneys 
only 13 percent of the time.”49 
E. 2002 Survey 
Nearly two decades later a second survey of laboratories, 
conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, revealed that there 
were now 351 publicly funded forensic laboratories in the 
United States50—more than three times the number that existed 
in 1967. These included 203 state or regional, 65 county, 50 
municipal, and 33 federal labs.51 The size of the laboratories 
                                                          
46 Id. at 13. 
47 Id. at 14-15. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 15-16. A later investigation attempted to gauge the impact of 
labs on the justice system, finding that approximately “one quarter of the 
citizens who had served on juries which were presented with scientific 
evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have 
changed their verdicts—from guilty to not guilty.” Joseph L. Peterson et al., 
The Use and Effects of Forensic Science in the Adjudication of Felony Cases, 
32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987). 
50 Joseph L. Peterson & Matthew J. Hickman, Census of Publicly 
Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories, 2002, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
BULL. (Feb. 2005). 
51 Id. at 1. 
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varied considerably. “A typical laboratory in 2002 had 2 
managers, 2 secretaries or clerks, 12 analysts, and 2 technicians. 
The median laboratory operating budget in 2002 was $1.3 
million.”52 In contrast, the FBI Laboratory, the largest publicly 
funded forensic laboratory in the country, had 585 full-time 
employees as of January 2004, more than twice the size of the 
next largest publicly funded crime lab.53 In addition to the FBI 
facility,54 federal laboratories are operated by the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Internal Revenue Service, Postal 
Inspection Service, Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms, Customs Service, and the military.55 The federal 
laboratories often provide their services to state law enforcement 
agencies. The services of the FBI Laboratory, for instance, are 
“available without charge to all duly constituted state, county, 
and municipal law enforcement agencies of the United States and 
its territorial possessions.”56 Approximately half of all the lab 
requests in 2002 were for drug examinations.57 In contrast, only 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 11. 
54 The new FBI Lab at Quantico, Virginia, was dedicated in 2003. At a 
cost of over $150 million, it took four years to build. See generally Modern 
Marvels: FBI’s Crime Lab (The History Channel 2004) (discussing the 
historical and recent advancements of the FBI crime lab); DAVID FISHER, 
HARD EVIDENCE: HOW DETECTIVES INSIDE THE FBI’S SCI-CRIME LAB HAVE 
HELPED SOLVE AMERICA’S TOUGHEST CASES (1995) (discussing the FBI 
Lab’s successes). 
55 Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance 
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1328-29 
(2004) (citing cases in which experts from these labs testified). 
56 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(g) (2006) (authorizing the FBI lab “to provide, 
without cost, technical and scientific assistance . . ., for all duly constituted 
law enforcement agencies, . . . which may desire to avail themselves of the 
service”). “It is quite common to find FBI or other federal experts testifying 
in state criminal proceedings about a diverse array of forensic procedures, 
including the analysis of drugs, blood, hair, fibers, firearms, fingerprints, 
gunshot residues, shoeprints, voice comparisons, and the like.” Giannelli, 
supra note 55, at 1329-30 (footnotes omitted). 
57 Peterson & Hickman, supra note 50, at 1. 
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2 percent involved DNA.58 Only 52 percent had resources 
dedicated to training, and a mere 12 percent had resources for 
research.59 
Questions persisted, however. A 1997 needs assessment of 
the California state-run system “found major problems in several 
of the system’s laboratory facilities, including safety concerns, 
overcrowding, and the potential for cross-contamination of 
evidence,” and a 1998 state audit “found that the majority of 
crime laboratories operated by local law enforcement agencies in 
that state greatly needed new facilities and equipment and that 
their quality assurance and training programs were hampered by 
a lack of funding.”60 
II. NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were two 
developments that would have profound effects on crime labs—
the introduction of proficiency testing in forensic science and the 
creation of a voluntary laboratory accreditation program. The 
first highlighted serious shortcomings in the operation of some 
laboratories and the performance of some examiners. The 
second represented the first attempt at the self-regulation of 
laboratories. 
A. The Advent of Proficiency Testing 
In 1978, the results of the first Laboratory Proficiency 
Testing Program, sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA), were reported.61 Over 200 crime 
laboratories participated in this program, which involved such 
common forensic examinations as firearms, blood, drug, and 
                                                          
58 Id. at 6. 
59 Id. at 1. 
60 Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 30, at 563. 
61 JOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY 
TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAM (1978). 
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trace evidence analyses.62 Seventy-one percent of the crime 
laboratories tested provided unacceptable results in a blood test, 
51.4 percent made errors in matching paint samples, 35.5 
percent erred in a soil examination, and 28.2 percent made 
mistakes in firearms identifications.63 The Report concluded: “A 
wide range of proficiency levels among the nation’s laboratories 
exists, with several evidence types posing serious difficulties for 
the laboratories . . . .”64 Thus, although some laboratories 
performed exceptionally well, the performance of others was 
disturbing: “65 percent of the laboratories had 80 percent or 
more of their results fall into the acceptable category. At the 
other end of the spectrum, 3 percent of laboratories had less 
than 50 percent of their responses considered acceptable.”65 
Similarly, certain types of examinations caused few problems, 
whereas others produced very high rates of “unacceptable 
proficiency.”66 Unacceptable proficiency was most often 
attributed to: (1) misinterpretation of test results due to 
carelessness or inexperience; (2) failure to employ adequate or 
appropriate methodology; (3) mislabeling or contamination of 
primary standards; and (4) inadequate databases or standard 
spectra.67 
Given these results, one would have expected the 
implementation of fairly extensive reforms. However, “[t]he 
startling conclusions from that research led to some efforts to 
                                                          
62 Id. at 1-2. 
63 Id. at 251. 
64 Id. at 3. 
65 Peterson, supra note 27, at 195. 
66 The number of laboratories responding ranged from a low of 65 to a 
high of 205. An unacceptable response did not necessarily mean an incorrect 
one. Other reasons for an unacceptable designation included a correct 
response for the wrong reason, an unsupported, inclusive response, multiple 
responses, and incomplete responses. Id. at 188-91. 
67 PETERSON ET AL., supra note 61, at 258. Professor Peterson, one of 
the report’s authors, later commented: “In spite of being a firm advocate of 
forensic science, I must acknowledge that a disturbingly high percentage of 
laboratories are not performing routine tests competently, as shown by our 
proficiency testing.” Symposium on Sci. and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 
101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1983) (remarks of Professor Joseph L. Peterson). 
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improve conditions in the laboratories, but these encounter[ed] 
institutional inertia against reform.”68 In sum, widespread 
reform (e.g., mandatory accreditation of laboratories and 
certification of examiners) failed to materialize.69 Yet, from this 
time forward proficiency testing would be part of the forensic 
lexicon.70 
B. The Creation of ASCLD/LAB 
The proficiency testing results, however, did provide the 
impetus for the formation of the American Society of Crime Lab 
Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) in 
                                                          
68 Symposium, supra note 67, at 645 (remarks of Professor Joseph L. 
Peterson). For a more detailed discussion of proficiency testing, see Michael 
J. Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science, 34 
J. FORENSIC SCI. 772, 778 (1989) (reviewing proficiency testing results; 
“Perhaps the major lessons to be drawn from this are that errors are indeed 
made and that there is a wide range of interlaboratory variation.”). 
69 Accreditation focuses on the laboratory, while certification focuses on 
the individual examiner. 
Unlike most other scientific professions, the criminalistics (crime 
laboratory) field is without procedures to assess and recognize 
members of the profession who have satisfied minimum criteria 
for practicing in their forensic specialty. . . . [G]uidelines were 
presented to the nation’s crime laboratory personnel for approval 
in the form of a referendum in the fall of 1979. The subsequent 
response, unfortunately, was distinctly negative; the certification 
referendum was defeated by a two-to-one margin. Consequently, 
at the present time, the criminalistics profession is without any 
minimum standards regarding who is qualified to practice in the 
field. 
Peterson, The Crime Lab, supra note 27 at 197. 
70 See Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Feasibility of External Blind DNA 
Proficiency Testing. 1. Background and Findings, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 21 
(2003); Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory 
Proficiency Testing Results, 1978-1991, I: Identification and Classification of 
Physical Evidence, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 994 (1995); Joseph L. Peterson & 
Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978-
1991, II: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009 
(1995). 
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1981, a second noteworthy development. Its purpose was to 
establish an accreditation program for public and private crime 
laboratories.71 Requirements include ensuring the integrity of 
evidence, adhering to valid and generally accepted procedures, 
employing qualified examiners, and operating quality assurance 
programs—i.e., proficiency testing, technical reviews, audits, 
and corrective action procedures.72  
Although it has been criticized as being too closely tied to 
the laboratories it accredits,73 this criticism is overblown and 
ASCLD/LAB has been one of the most effective reform 
mechanisms in forensic science over the last two decades.74 
Only 10 percent of laboratories pass muster on the first 
inspection. Moreover, in 1993, ASCLD/LAB provided the 
review of the misconduct in the Fred Zain case,75 and in 2005, 
it issued a critical report of the Virginia state lab in the Earl 
Washington case.76 Regrettably, accreditation is voluntary, and 
                                                          
71 Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 30, at 578. 
72 Id. 
73 See Janine Arvizu, Shattering the Myth: Forensic Laboratories, 24 
THE CHAMPION 18, 20 (May 2000) (“The ASCLD/LAB is essentially a trade 
organization of crime laboratory directors. The membership of the 
ASCLD/LAB delegate assembly consists solely of the laboratory directors of 
ASCLD accredited laboratories.”); Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches 
Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work, Resistance to Scrutiny Seen Across U.S., CHI. 
TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, at C1 (“I believe they are more of a fraternal 
organization than an authoritative scientific body.”; quoting James Durkin, a 
former Cook County prosecutor and former Republican state representative). 
74 This is not to say the ASCLD/LAB program could not be improved. 
For example, its governing board could be expanded to include outside 
scientists from academia and representatives from the legal community, 
including the defense bar, and it may be that some of its accreditation 
requirements should be raised. 
75 See infra text accompanying notes 117-19 (discussing Zain’s 
misconduct). 
76 See ASCLD/LAB LIMITED SCOPE INTERIM INSPECTION REPORT: 
COMMONWEALTH OF VA. DIV. OF FORENSIC SCI. CENTRAL LABORATORY 
(April 9, 2005). See generally MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN, THE 
NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. (2003) (examining the 
Washington case); Eric M. Freedman, Earl Washington’s Ordeal, 29 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089 (2001). 
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while numerous labs have been accredited, many have not.77 
III. DNA PROFILING 
The advent of DNA profiling in 1985 revolutionized forensic 
science.78 One court called DNA evidence the “single greatest 
advance in the search for truth . . . since the advent of 
cross-examination.”79 Even its early critics acknowledged that 
                                                          
77 In 2002, the President of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
wrote: 
Unfortunately, while the ASCLD/LAB program has been 
successful in accrediting over 200 Laboratories, a large number 
of forensic laboratories in the U.S. remain unaccredited by any 
agency. A similar situation exists with death investigation 
agencies accredited by the National Association of Medical 
Examiners (NAME); forty such medical systems have been 
accredited, covering only 25% of the U.S. population. The same 
dichotomy exists in certification programs for the practicing 
forensic scientist, even though forensic certification boards for 
all the major disciples have been in existence for over a 
decade. . . . Why have forensic laboratories and individuals 
been so reluctant to become accredited or certified? 
Graham R. Jones, President’s Editorial—The Changing Practice of Forensic 
Science, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 437, 438 (2002). 
78 In 1985, Dr. Alec Jeffreys of the University of Leicester, England, 
recognized the utility of DNA profiling in criminal cases. See OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC 
USES OF DNA TESTS 8 (1990) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. Its first use in 
American courts occurred in 1986. Id. at 14. The first appellate case, 
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) review denied, 
542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989) held that DNA evidence was admissible. By 
January 1990, forensic DNA analysis had been admitted into evidence “in at 
least 185 cases by 38 States and the U.S. military.” OTA REPORT, supra, at 
14. 
79 People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Co. Ct. 1988) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The popular press trumpeted DNA evidence as 
“foolproof.” DNA Prints: A Foolproof Crime Test, TIME, Jan. 26, 1987, at 
66. See also Arastasia Toufexis, Convicted by Their Genes: A New Forensic 
Test is Revolutionizing Criminal Prosecutions, TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 74. 
Moreover, the private DNA laboratories, Lifecodes and Cellmark, promoted 
DNA’s use by claiming that it had “the power to identify one individual in 
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“[a]ppropriately carried out and correctly interpreted, DNA 
typing is possibly the most powerful innovation in forensics 
since the development of fingerprinting in the last part of the 
19th Century.”80 No other technique had been as complex or so 
subject to rapid change. New DNA technologies were introduced 
at the trial level as cases litigating the older procedures worked 
their way through the appellate court system.81 As one 
                                                          
the world’s population” and “the chance that any two people will have the 
same DNA print is one in 30 billion.” Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, 
When Science Takes the Witness Stand, SCI. AM., May 1990, at 46, 50. 
“Cellmark entitled one of its informational brochures DNA FingerprintingSM, 
The Ultimate Identification Test.” Dan Burk, DNA Identification: Possibilities 
and Pitfalls Revisited, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 53, 85 n.119 (Fall 1990). 
80 Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in 
Forensic DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745, 1746 (1991). A National Academy 
of Sciences report echoed this sentiment: “DNA analysis is one of the 
greatest technical achievements for criminal investigation since the discovery 
of fingerprints.” NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF 
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 73 (1996) [hereinafter NRC II]. 
81 The initial technique, Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism 
(RFLP) analysis by gel electrophoresis, was soon supplanted by Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (PCR)-based methods involving the DQ-alpha locus, 
“polymarkers,” and the D1S80 locus. These, in turn, were replaced by Short 
Tandem Repeats, the current procedure. See 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & 
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENCE EVIDENCE ch. 18 (3d ed. 1999) 
(discussing admissibility of DNA evidence). In addition to nuclear DNA 
analysis, courts have admitted evidence based on mitochondrial DNA 
(mtDNA) sequencing, as well as DNA analyses of animals, plants, and the 
HIV virus. See United States v. Boswell, 270 F.3d 1200, 1205 (8th Cir. 
2001) (comparing swine blood); State v. Bogan, 905 P.2d 515, 520 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1995) (tree); State v. Schmidt, 699 So. 2d 448, 452-56 (La. Ct. 
App. 1997) (admitting expert testimony that HIV viruses from two persons 
were “closely related” using phylogenetic analysis and statistical testing in a 
case regarding attempted murder by injection of HIV virus). Finally, the use 
of DNA databases for “cold hits” presents additional evidentiary issues. See 
People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he 
fact that many profiles have been searched increases the probability of finding 
a match, so that conceptually, the more populated the database, the less 
impressive the match. Appellant contends that there is broad scientific 
consensus concerning the need to determine differently the statistical 
significance of profile matches in a cold hit case versus a confirmation case, 
but says that the means of determining the statistical value of a cold hit ‘is a 
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prosecutor observed, DNA evidence “raised issues at the cutting 
edge of modern law and science.”82 
The power of DNA analysis, however, could only be 
harnessed by introducing scientific methodologies into the crime 
lab, the lack of which became apparent in some of the early 
evidentiary hearings.83 As a result of these challenges, New 
York became the first state to regulate its crime labs.84 In 
addition, the potential for DNA databases produced the first 
federal legislation regulating forensic science—the DNA 
Identification Act of 1994.85 Finally, as innocent convicts were 
exonerated by DNA and released from prison, reformers began 
to cast a critical eye on the forensic techniques that led to some 
of these wrongful incarcerations, often finding traditional 
forensic techniques deficient, especially when compared with 
DNA profiling.86 
A. Admissibility Wars 
Early cases accepted DNA without question. There was no 
defense expert in Andrews v. State,87 the first reported appellate 
case considering the admissibility of DNA evidence. Nor was 
there a defense expert in Spencer v. Commonwealth,88 the first 
DNA execution case.89 At trial, the prosecution experts 
“testified unequivocally that there was no disagreement in the 
scientific community about the reliability of DNA print 
                                                          
matter of continuing and strident debate.’”). 
82 HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLOOD CRIED OUT: A PROSECUTOR’S 
SPELLBINDING ACCOUNT OF THE POWER OF DNA 21 (1996). 
83 See infra text accompanying notes 92-102. 
84 See infra text accompanying notes 113-16. 
85 See infra text accompanying notes 109-12. 
86 See infra text accompanying notes 117-27. 
87 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
88 384 S.E.2d 785, 792 (Va. 1989). 
89 See Murderer Put to Death in Virginia: First U.S. Execution Based on 
DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at A19 (reporting Spencer’s 
execution). 
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testing”90 and claimed that there was “no dissent whatsoever in 
the scientific community.”91 This bit of self-deception was soon 
shattered. In a landmark case, People v. Castro,92 the court 
wrote: “In a piercing attack upon each molecule of evidence 
presented, the defense was successful in demonstrating to this 
court that the testing laboratory failed in its responsibility to 
perform the accepted scientific techniques and experiments.”93 
Castro involved a 14-week evidentiary hearing with a 5,000-
page transcript.94 In an unusual occurrence, the prosecution and 
defense experts met without the attorneys and issued a joint 
statement, including the following: “[T]he DNA data in this case 
are not scientifically reliable enough to support the assertion that 
the samples . . . do or do not match. If this data were submitted 
to a peer reviewed journal in support of a conclusion, it would 
not be accepted. Further experimentation would be required.”95 
One scholar summed it up this way: 
The substance of the preliminary hearing in Castro 
stands for the idea that the standards of research 
scientists ought to be the standards of forensic 
science—an idea that, if taken to its logical extreme, 
could make many kinds of commonly-used forensic 
evidence, from fingerprint identifications to expert 
document examination to ballistics analysis 
inadmissible in court until additional research is done 
to establish the validity of the claims to which 
forensic experts routinely testify.96 
Castro was not alone.97 In United States v. Yee,98 the first 
                                                          
90 Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 792. 
91 Id. at 797. 
92 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989). 
93 Id. at 996. 
94 Id. at 986. 
95 Lander, supra note 4, at 504. 
96 Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro: Challenging the Forensic Use 
of DNA Evidence, in EVIDENCE STORIES 207, 209 (Richard Lempert ed., 
2006). 
97 The Office of Technology Assessment report also recognized that 
[s]erious questions are raised . . . about how best to ensure that 
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DNA case involving the FBI’s profiling system, an extensive 
six-week admissibility hearing was held. Each side had retained 
exceptional attorneys who had access to impressive expert 
witnesses.99 Yee was a major test for DNA evidence, and it 
passed. Nevertheless, parts of the magistrate’s report were 
troublesome. The magistrate wrote that “the FBI program of 
proficiency testing has serious deficiencies, even without 
consideration of the troubling hint in the record of an impulse at 
one point to destroy some of the small amount of test data that 
had been accumulated earlier.”100 In another passage, he wrote: 
“I do not either disregard or discount the accuracy of many of 
the criticisms about the remarkably poor quality of the FBI’s 
work and infidelity to important scientific principles.”101 The 
FBI’s top DNA scientist, Dr. Bruce Budowle, would later 
acknowledge the shortfalls of DNA evidence when first 
introduced: 
The initial outcry over DNA typing standards 
concerned laboratory problems: poorly defined rules 
for declaring a match; experiments without controls; 
contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy 
interpretation of autoradiograms. Although there is no 
evidence that these technical failings resulted in any 
wrongful convictions, the lack of standards seemed to 
                                                          
any particular test result is reliable. These questions focus on 
data interpretation, how to minimize realistic human error, and 
the appropriate level of monitoring to ensure quality. Such 
questions, which stem from actual court cases, underscore the 
need to develop both technical and operational standards now. 
OTA REPORT, supra note 78, at 83 (emphasis in original). 
98 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff’d sub nom., United States v. 
Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993). 
99 The prominent experts for the prosecution included Dr. Thomas 
Caskey of Baylor University and Dr. Kenneth K. Kidd of Yale University. 
Dr. Richard C. Lewontin of Harvard University and Dr. Daniel Hartl, then 
of Washington University, were defense experts. Dr. Eric Lander served as a 
court appointed expert. See id. 
100 Id. at 208. 
101 Id. at 210. 
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be a recipe for trouble.102 
The DNA admissibility wars highlighted the need for a more 
scientific approach to forensic evidence.103 The National 
Academy of Sciences issued two reports on the subject, noting 
the importance of certain practices: “No laboratory should let its 
results with a new DNA typing method be used in court, unless 
it has undergone . . . proficiency testing via blind trials.”104 The 
initial skirmishes over laboratory protocols regarding DNA 
quickly gave way to fights over statistical interpretation and 
population genetics.105 These challenges had a salutary effect.106 
                                                          
102 Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid 
to Rest, 371 NATURE 735, 735 (Oct. 27, 1994). See also JAMES D. WATSON 
& ANDREW BERRY, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE 273 (2004) (“Initially, when 
DNA fingerprinting was done in forensic laboratories without special 
expertise in handling and analyzing DNA, critical mistakes were not 
uncommon.”). Watson, along with Francis Crick, discovered the double helix 
structure of DNA. Id. at 11-12. 
103 See William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New 
Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons From the DNA ‘War,’ 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993). 
104 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC 
SCIENCE 55 (1992) [hereinafter NRC I REPORT]. As requested by the FBI, a 
second report followed. See NRC II, supra note 80, at v-vii. The second 
report also recommended proficiency testing. See id. at 88 (Recommendation 
3.2: “Laboratories should participate regularly in proficiency tests, and the 
results should be available for court proceedings.”). 
105 See Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting, 254 
SCIENCE 1721, 1721 (Dec. 20, 1991) (noting that “a half-dozen courts 
recently refused to admit DNA evidence on the grounds that the probability 
calculations are not generally accepted”); see also Ranajit Chakraborty & 
Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 SCIENCE 
1735, 1735 (Dec. 20, 1991) (acknowledging inconsistencies in DNA data, 
while expressing the opinion that DNA fingerprinting still yields “a 
meaningful estimate” that a jury can rely on). 
106 See MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 204 
(2001) (The British “Forensic Science Service adopted a method of 
calculating DNA match probabilities that had been proposed by statisticians 
associated with the defence side of the DNA dispute.”). See also Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. 
REV. 13, 70 (2001) (“[W]hile it is easy to disparage ‘battles of the experts’ 
as expensive, misleading, and confusing to the factfinder, these battles may 
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Even the DNA proponents subsequently conceded that “most 
would now agree that this extended debate has been good for the 
science.”107 
It was not long before commentators were asking why such 
procedures were not applied in other forensic fields.108 In short, 
DNA analysis became the gold standard against which other 
forensic sciences would be measured. 
B. 1994 Federal Legislation 
The passage of the landmark DNA Identification Act of 
1994109 represented the first federal attempt to regulate a crime 
lab procedure. It authorized the creation of a national database 
for the DNA profiles of convicted offenders as well as a 
database for crime scene profiles: the Combined DNA Index 
System (CODIS). Bringing CODIS online was a monumental 
endeavor, and its successful operation required an effective 
quality assurance program. As one government report noted, 
“the integrity of the data contained in CODIS is extremely 
                                                          
also reveal genuine weaknesses in proffered expert knowledge.”). 
107 IAN W. EVETT & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: 
STATISTICAL GENETICS FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS xiv (1998). See also 
Richard Lempert, Comment: Theory and Practice in DNA Fingerprinting, 9 
STATISTICAL SCI. 255, 258 (1994) (“[I]n this instance the importation of legal 
adversariness into the scientific world has spurred both valuable research and 
practical improvements in the way DNA is analyzed and presented.”). 
108 See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA 
“Fingerprinting” Can Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 
CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 372 (1991) (“[F]orensic scientists, like scientists in 
all other fields, should subject their claims to methodologically rigorous 
empirical tests. The results of these tests should be published and debated. 
Until such steps are taken, the strong claims of forensic scientists must be 
regarded with far more caution than they traditionally have been.”). See also 
Mnookin, supra note 96, at 43 (“One consequence of DNA profiling and its 
admissibility into court is that it has opened the door to challenging 
fingerprinting.”); Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 
143, 143 (2005) (“DNA identification has not only transformed and 
revolutionized forensic science, it has also created a new set of standards that 
have raised expectations for forensic science in general.”). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 14131(a) & (c) (2000). 
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important since the DNA matches provided by CODIS are 
frequently a key piece of evidence linking a suspect to a 
crime.”110 The statute created a DNA Advisory Board (DAB) to 
assist in promulgating quality assurance standards.111 The Act 
also required proficiency testing for analysts in the FBI as well 
as those in labs participating in the national database or 
receiving federal funding.112 
C. New York Statute 
In the same year that Congress enacted DNA legislation, 
New York became the first state to regulate its forensic 
laboratories.113 The New York statute established a Commission 
on Forensic Science,114 which is authorized (1) to develop 
minimum standards and a program of accreditation for all state 
laboratories, (2) to establish minimum qualifications for 
laboratory directors and other personnel, and (3) to approve 
                                                          
110 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT, 
THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM ii (2001). 
111 42 U.S.C. § 14131(a) (2000). The legislation contained a sunset 
provision; DAB would expire after five years unless extended by the Director 
of the FBI. 42 U.S.C. § 14131(b) (2000). The FBI had established the 
Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (TWGDAM) in 1988 
to develop standards. TWGDAM functioned under DAB. It was renamed 
Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM) in 1999 
and replaced the DAB when the latter expired. See NORAH RUDIN & KEITH 
INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 180 (2d ed. 2002). 
112 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2) (2006) (external proficiency testing for 
CODIS participation); id. at §14133(a)(1)(A) (2006) (FBI examiners). DAB 
Standard 13 implements this requirement. DNA ADVISORY BOARD STANDARD 
13 (1998). The Justice for All Act, enacted in 2004, amended the statute, 
requiring all DNA labs to be accredited within two years “by a nonprofit 
professional association of persons actively involved in forensic science that 
is nationally recognized within the forensic science community” and to 
“undergo external audits, not less than once every 2 years, that demonstrate 
compliance with standards established by the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2) (2006). 
113 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995b (McKinney 2006) (requiring accreditation 
by the state Forensic Science Commission). 
114 N.Y. EXEC. § 995-a (McKinney 1996). 
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forensic laboratories for the performance of specific forensic 
methodologies.115 Significantly, research scientists and the 
defense bar were represented on the Commission.116 
D. DNA Exonerations 
DNA technology had an additional effect on the regulation of 
forensic science, one emanating from its power to exonerate the 
innocent. One of the first defendants to be freed was Glen 
Woodall,117 whose exoneration triggered an investigation of the 
West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory,118 a process that 
                                                          
115 See Michael Saks et al., Model Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous 
Convictions Act, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 669, 698-703 (2001) (discussing 
Commission on Forensic Science Services). 
116 N.Y. EXEC. § 995-a (McKinney 1996). The commission has fourteen 
members. The commissioner of the division of criminal justice services is the 
chair. The commissioner of the department of health or a designee is an ex-
officio member. Twelve members are appointed by the governor: (1) one is a 
chair of the N.Y. state crime laboratory advisory committee; (2) one is a 
director of a N.Y. forensic laboratory; (3) one is the director of the office of 
forensic services; (4) two are scientists with experience in laboratory 
standards or quality assurance regulation and monitoring, appointed upon 
recommendation of the commissioner of health; (5) one is a representative of 
a law enforcement agency, appointed upon the recommendation of the 
commissioner of criminal justice services; (6) one is a representative of 
prosecution services, appointed upon the recommendation of the 
commissioner of criminal justice services; (7) one is a representative of the 
public criminal defense bar, appointed upon the recommendation of an 
organization representing public defense services; (8) one is a representative 
of the private criminal defense bar, appointed upon the recommendation of an 
organization of such bar; (9) two are members-at-large, one of whom is 
appointed upon the recommendation of the temporary president of the senate 
and the other upon the recommendation of the speaker of the assembly; and 
(10) one is an attorney or judge with a background in privacy issues and 
biomedical ethics, appointed upon the recommendation of the chief judge of 
the court of appeals. Id. 
117 See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY 
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 74-76 (1996) (National 
Institute of Justice report documenting twenty-eight exoneration cases). 
118 See George Castelle, Lab Fraud: Lessons Learned from the Fred Zain 
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revealed the laboratory malfeasance of Fred Zain. Zain’s acts of 
misconduct included: 
(1) overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating 
the frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces 
of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic 
matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting 
that multiple items had been tested, when only a 
single item had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive 
results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering 
laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create the 
erroneous impression that genetic markers had been 
obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report 
conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report 
conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting 
results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when 
testing supported only a match with the victim; and 
(11) reporting scientifically impossible or improbable 
results.119 
The Zain affair illustrated the importance of written 
protocols, accurate lab notes, and technical reviews. 
Unfortunately, Zain was not alone. In Actual Innocence, 
Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer examined 62 of 
the first DNA exonerations secured through Cardozo Law 
School’s Innocence Project to ascertain which factors contributed 
to these miscarriages of justice. One of the more astounding 
conclusions was that one-third of these cases involved “tainted 
or fraudulent science.”120 By September of 2006, DNA evidence 
                                                          
Affair, THE CHAMPION 12 (May 1999); Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of 
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime 
Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439 (1997). A number of TV shows 
documented his abuses. See Right on, Fred Zain, CBS 60 MINUTES, April 
24, 1994; Body of Evidence, NBC DATELINE, April 21, 1999. 
119 In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology 
Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting ASCLD report). 
120 BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO 
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 248 
(2000). The other causes include: Mistaken eyewitnesses (84%); Police 
misconduct (50%); Prosecutorial misconduct (42%); Ineffective defense 
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had exonerated at least 184 convicts.121 Another report, which 
identified an additional 196 non-DNA exonerations,122 noted that 
twenty-four cases involved “perjury by forensic scientists 
testifying for the government.”123 Subsequent scandals in 
Oklahoma and Texas led those states to legislate lab 
accreditation.124 Similarly, problems in the Virginia DNA lab125 
caused that state to make the Division of Forensic Science a 
separate agency under the Secretary of Public Safety126 and to 
create a Forensic Science Board and a Scientific Advisory 
Committee.127 
IV. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INITIATIVES 
As the number of DNA exonerations grew, the legal 
profession could no longer dismiss these miscarriages of justice 
                                                          
counsel (27%); False confessions (24%); Jailhouse snitches (21%) Id. 
121 See http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
122 See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005). “Overall, we 
found 340 exonerations . . . . ; 144 of them were cleared by DNA evidence, 
196 by other means.” Id. at 524 (internal citations omitted). 
123 Id. at 543. 
124 Forensic Laboratory Accreditation Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 
150.37 (2004) (requiring accreditation by (ASCLD/LAB or the American 
Board of Forensic Toxicology); Forensic Analysis of Evidence, TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (2005) (requiring accreditation by the 
Department of Public Safety). See also DNA and Forensic Identification Data 
Base and Data Bank Act of 1998, CAL. PENAL CODE § 297 (2004) (requiring 
accreditation by ASCLD/LAB or any certifying body approved by 
ASCLD/LAB). Indiana does not require accreditation but does require a 
laboratory conducting forensic DNA analysis to implement and follow 
nationally recognized standards for DNA quality assurance and proficiency 
testing, such as those approved by ASCLD/LAB. Laboratory Standards, IND. 
CODE ANN. § 10-13-6-14 (2004). 
125 The problems stemmed from the Earl Washington case. See note 76 
supra. 
126 VA. CODE § 9.1-1100 (2005) (changing Division of Forensic Science 
into the Department of Forensic Science). Previously, it was under the 
Department of Criminal Justice Services. 
127 VA. CODE § 9.1-1111 & 1112 (2005). 
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as aberrational. The numbers were too large, and the nature of 
the causes too repetitive. Systemic problems were uncovered, 
and comprehensive reforms were called for. 
A. Innocence Policies 
As a result, in 2002 the ABA Criminal Justice Section 
established the Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the 
Integrity of the Criminal Process.128 Forensic science was one 
concern, and the ABA eventually recommended that “[c]rime 
laboratories and medical examiner offices should be accredited, 
examiners should be certified, and procedures should be 
standardized and published to ensure the validity, reliability, and 
timely analysis of forensic evidence.”129 
Another ABA recommendation focused on funding.130 The 
underfunding of crime labs in this country is chronic.131 As 
noted earlier, both President Johnson’s and President Nixon’s 
                                                          
128 See REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC 
INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL 
PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE 
GUILTY (Paul C. Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
INNOCENCE REPORT]. The Committee was charged with undertaking a review 
of the causes for wrongful convictions and recommending policies to better 
ensure that individuals will not be convicted of crimes they did not commit. 
Over a three-year period, the Committee drafted resolutions and 
accompanying reports that have now been adopted by the ABA House of 
Delegates. They include resolutions on: false confessions, eyewitness 
identification procedures, forensic evidence, jailhouse informants, defense 
counsel practices, investigative policies and personnel, prosecution practices, 
systemic remedies, and compensation for the wrongfully convicted. The 
resolutions include recommendations for videotaping all interrogations, 
accrediting crime laboratories, conducting double blind lineups, and requiring 
corroboration in all cases involving jailhouse snitches. Id. 
129 Id. at 47. 
130 Id. 
131 OTA REPORT, supra note 78, at 29 (“Most agree that crime 
laboratories and forensic sciences research that supports technology transfer 
to crime laboratories are underfunded. Increasingly, indications are that crime 
laboratories are experiencing difficulties managing the steadily rising influx of 
casework.”). 
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Crime Commissions acknowledged the problem.132 Twenty years 
later, a report on Washington State crime labs revealed that a 
“staggering backlog of cases hinders investigations of murder, 
rape, arson, and other major crimes.”133 At any time, 
“thousands of pieces of evidence collected from crime scenes sit 
unanalyzed and ignored on shelves in laboratories and police 
stations across the state.”134 A USA Today survey reached the 
same conclusion: “Evidence that could imprison the guilty or 
free the innocent is languishing on shelves and piling up in 
refrigerators of the nation’s overwhelmed and underfunded 
crime labs.”135 In one case, the delay on processing evidence of 
a rape was eighteen months, forcing the police to release the 
suspect, and giving him time to rape a fourth victim.136 
The ABA also recommended the appointment of defense 
experts for indigent defendants “whenever reasonably necessary 
to the defense.”137 While the Supreme Court recognized a due 
process right to a defense expert in Ake v. Oklahoma,138 a 
                                                          
132 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 
255 (1967) (“[T]he great majority of police department laboratories have only 
minimal equipment and lack highly skilled personnel able to use the modern 
equipment now being developed.”); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM’N ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 304 (1974) 
(“Too many police crime laboratories have been set up on budgets that 
preclude the recruitment of qualified, professional personnel.”). 
133 Tomas Guillen & Eric Nalder, Overwhelming Evidence—Crime Labs 
in Crisis—Staggering Backlog of Cases Hinders Investigations of Murder, 
Rape, Arson and Other Major Crimes, SEATTLE TIMES, Jun. 19, 1994, at 
A14. 
134 Id. 
135 Becky Beaupre & Peter Eisler, Crime Lab Crisis, USA TODAY, Aug. 
20, 1996, at 1. 
136 Id. 
137 INNOCENCE REPORT, supra note 128, at 47. See also ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5-1.4, 
cmt. at 22 (3d ed. 1992) (“The quality of representation at trial . . . may be 
excellent and yet unhelpful to the defendant if the defense requires the 
assistance of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no such services are 
available.”). 
138 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
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number of sources indicate that the lack of defense experts 
continues to be a significant problem.139 Finally, the ABA 
highlighted the importance of lawyer training in forensic 
science, as well as attorney competence.140 
B. ABA Standards on DNA Evidence 
A second ABA project will also undoubtedly impact the 
regulation of forensic science. The ABA Standards on DNA 
Evidence cover a wide range of topics.141 Part III of the 
                                                          
139 See Giannelli, supra note 55, at 1311-13 (discussing the various 
reports). 
140 See, e.g., Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1209-11 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(finding ineffective assistance in penalty phase of capital murder case for 
failing to present evidence of defendant’s mental retardation/neurological 
impairment, and by acquiescing to prosecutor’s suggestion that experts 
requested by defense be treated as court-appointed rather than defense 
experts, and by failing to challenge expert reports); Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 
701, 709 (8th Cir. 1995) (In a capital murder case, whether alleged murder 
weapon had blood matching the victim’s constituted an issue of the utmost 
importance. Under these circumstances, a reasonable defense lawyer would 
take some measures to understand the laboratory tests performed and the 
inferences that one could logically draw from the results. At the very least, 
any reasonable attorney under the circumstances would study the state’s 
laboratory report with sufficient care so that if the prosecution advanced a 
theory at trial that was at odds with the serology evidence, the defense would 
be in a position to expose it on cross-examination.”); Foster v. Lockhart, 9 
F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure to pursue an impotency 
defense in a rape case violated the right to effective assistance of counsel); 
United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1418 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding 
that failure to consult handwriting expert made out a viable claim of 
ineffectiveness); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that failure to have quilt examined for gunshot residue rendered 
representation ineffective). 
141 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON DNA EVIDENCE (adopted 
August 2006). The Standards include provisions on: 
(1) the collection, preservation, and retention of biological evidence, 
(2) pretrial disclosure, 
(3) defense testing and retesting, 
(4) the admissibility of DNA evidence, 
(5) post-conviction testing, 
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Standards governs the testing of DNA Evidence and includes 
provisions on laboratories and the testing and interpretation of 
DNA evidence. The Standards mandate (1) accreditation, for 
crime laboratories every two years, (2) written policies, 
including protocols for testing and interpreting test results, (3) 
quality assurance procedures, including audits, proficiency 
testing, and corrective action protocols, (4) procedures designed 
to minimize cognitive bias when interpreting test results, and (5) 
timely reports of credible evidence of lab misconduct or serious 
negligence.142 
The Standards stress two other points. The first is 
transparency; most laboratory protocols and procedures should 
be publicly available.143 The second is documentation. Each step 
in the testing of DNA evidence and in the interpretation of the 
test results should be recorded contemporaneously in case 
notes.144 All case notes made and raw electronic data produced 
during testing should be preserved and are discoverable.145 
CONCLUSION 
DNA evidence has revolutionized forensic science. The 
DNA admissibility wars forced laboratories to develop protocols 
for declaring a match, to use controls in testing, and to 
promulgate procedures for interpreting autoradiograms. These 
challenges also produced the first state statute on lab 
accreditation—in New York, and the first federal legislation 
regulating a forensic science. DNA profiling not only set the 
“gold standard” for forensic evidence but also highlighted the 
shortcomings of other forensic techniques through the 
exonerations it produced. 
                                                          
(6) charging persons by DNA profile, and 
(7) DNA databases. 
Id. 
142 ABA Standard 3.1(a). 
143 Id. at 1.2(c) & 3.1(a)(vii). 
144 Id. at 3.2. 
145 Id. at 4.1(a). 
GINAELLI OUT 3/3/2007 1:08 AM 
 REGULATING CRIME LABORATORIES 91 
The impact of DNA analysis on forensic science in general 
and crime labs in particular should be understood in a larger 
context. In 1993, the year before the federal and New York 
statutes were passed, the Supreme Court handed down its 
landmark decision on the admissibility of expert testimony—
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.146 If DNA 
evidence revolutionized forensic science, Daubert and its 
progeny147 revolutionized the admissibility standard for evidence 
based on forensic science. Daubert has been transformed from a 
case that most courts and commentators believed lowered the 
barriers to the admissibility of scientific evidence to one that the 
Court now describes as imposing an “exacting” standard.148 
Indeed, some federal courts have read the Daubert trilogy as 
inviting a “reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’ 
venerable, technical fields.”149 As a result, attacks have been 
launched against handwriting evidence,150 hair comparisons,151 
                                                          
146 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
147 The Court followed with General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 
136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), to 
make up what is now known as the Daubert trilogy. 
148 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). See generally 
Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Revisited, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 302 (2005) 
(describing the transformation of Daubert). 
149 United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(handwriting comparison). See also United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 
2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002) (“Courts are now confronting challenges to 
testimony, as here, whose admissibility had long been settled.”; handwriting 
comparison). 
150 See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints, 43 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 624 (2006) (examining the controversy surrounding the 
admissibility of fingerprint evidence). 
151 See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 
1995) (“This court has been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any 
indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the 
requirements of Daubert.”), rev’d on this issue, Williamson v. Ward, 110 
F.3d 1508, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that due process, not Daubert, 
standard applies in habeas proceedings). See generally Paul C. Giannelli & 
Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 514 (2001) 
(discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was used to 
convict the innocent). 
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fingerprint examinations,152 firearms identification,153 bitemark 
analysis,154 gunshot residue testing,155 bullet composition 
evidence,156 and intoxication testing.157 While many of these 
challenges have failed, the landscape has irreversibly shifted. 
Lawyers are now accustomed to challenging forensic evidence. 
The combined effect of the introduction of DNA evidence 
and the Daubert decision has altered the forensic paradigm and 
has perhaps rendered the regulation of crime labs inevitable. 
                                                          
152 See Paul C. Giannelli & Carrin Cozza, Daubert Challenges to 
Handwriting Comparisons, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 347 (2006) (analyzing the case 
law and research in the field of questioned document analysis). 
153 See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005) 
(limiting testimony); Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability 
and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. 
SCIENCE & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2005). 
154 See I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark 
Analyses–A Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85, 86 (2001) (“Despite the 
continued acceptance of bitemark evidence in European, Oceanic and North 
American Courts, the fundamental scientific basis for bitemark analysis has 
never been established.”). 
155 See Michelle Nethercott & William C. Thompson, Lessons from 
Baltimore’s GSR Debacle, THE CHAMPION 36 (June 2005). 
156 See Ragland v. Commonwealth,191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006) 
(excluding evidence); Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059 (Md. 2006) (same); 
State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (same). See 
also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING 
BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 6 (2004). 
157 See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 549 (D. Md. 2002) 
(“Where, as here, that reliability has been challenged, the court cannot 
disregard the challenge, simply because a legion of earlier court decisions 
reached conclusions based on reference to the same then-unchallenged 
authority. . . . I cannot agree that [various intoxication] tests, singly or in 
combination, have been shown to be as reliable as asserted by Dr. Burns, the 
NHTSA publications, and the publications of the communities of law 
enforcement officers and state prosecutors.”) (footnote omitted). 
